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Abstract 
Residential property is a popular investment option and has historically attracted many small 
individual investors. For Australian small residential property investors, debt financing is attractive 
as can lower the initial equity component, comply with a favourable tax structure (negative 
gearing) and on past evidence provide long term headline returns. A major concern with this 
approach is uncertainty, where stable assumptions cease to hold and there is concentrated 
negative price movement. This extreme downside volatility may not be fully reflected in traditional 
risk calculations.  
This research studies 40 years of quarterly Melbourne established residential property market 
performance data for normal distribution features and signs of extreme downside risk. The results 
show that the normal bell curve distribution underestimated actual extreme values both by 
frequency and extent for ungeared residential property data. This is magnified as the gearing is 
increased to an extent where the outermost data point on 80% debt leverage shows an unrealistic 
probability of a 1 in 192 year event. Alternatively adopting the Cubic Power Law of returns, the 
probabilities of the most extreme event occurring drops to a realistic 1 in 38 year event. 
In highlighting the challenges to measuring the impact of leverage on residential property market 
performance, the analysis of extreme downside risk should be separated from traditional standard 
deviation risk calculations. In recognising these two different types of risk, extreme downside risk 
has a magnified domino effect with increased gearing levels. Small negative price movement in 
housing values and interest rates can multiply the equity risk for the investor and can lead to 
financial ruin which is well beyond the standard deviation risk measure. This needs to be 
recognised and developed as there is evidence that extreme downside risk determinants are 
increasing by magnitude, frequency and impact. 
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1. Introduction 
Housing is an important asset with a unique dual role, offering both social and economic benefits 
in providing shelter and as an attractive investment option. The physical fundamentals for 
residential property are easily understood by investors, driven by local demand from observed 
population growth and new supply scarcity based on planning approval data. This has led to 
residential property being a popular investment option which historically has attracted many small 
private landlord investors. 
In Australia, alongside physical demand and supply attributes, residential property ongoing strong 
popularity can be linked to a favourable taxation regime, available debt funding and the use of 
investment properties as a retirement asset. Approximately 1.9 million of the 23 million Australian 
population own one or more investment properties, which represents almost 25% of the 9 million 
Australian residential dwellings (ABS 2015, Kohler and van der Merwe 2015). 
Contributing to investor demand is the current low interest rate and the willingness of lenders to 
offer attractive debt packages with high gearing levels – 80% Loan to Value Ratio (LVR). For an 
investor, debt financing is attractive as can lower the initial equity component and provide long 
term headline returns. A major concern with this approach is that it works well under stable 
conditions – improving house prices and low interest rates. However when the stable 
assumptions cease to hold, house prices fall and interest rates increase, there is concentrated 
negative price movement. This can create a significant loss for an investor, compounded by 
leverage obligations with capital depreciation and regular mortgage payments. 
Given the recent strength of investor demand for Australian housing and the appetite for debt 
funding, the characteristics and risk strategy of small investors property exposure warrant closer 
examination as the returns may not match the risk, specifically the impact of large negative price 
fluctuations. Like residential property, these major downside risk events are inherent to many 
investment markets, and are often outside the realms of regular expectations. Commonly referred 
to in literature as statistical outliers (± 2 standard deviations), these downside risk events 
frequently have a combination of low predictability and large impact resulting in significant 
financial loss. Interestingly, whilst leading theorists and practitioners have recognised that the 
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frequency and magnitude of these extreme events should be a key financial market consideration, 
there is no literature on the residential property market application.  
This research studies 40 years of Melbourne quarterly residential property market performance 
data for signs of extreme downside risk. A metropolitan market was selected as residential 
markets across Australia can vary considerably based on local factors. For example, most 
recently Perth and Brisbane house prices have independently followed the global mining and 
energy commodity cycle. To compare with competing asset classes, a total return index was 
constructed and equity performance was examined with increased debt leverage levels. With the 
improved debt fuelled returns, the extreme downside risk is magnified. This requires further 
investigation by examining the probability distribution compared to a normal distribution curve. 
The application of a cubic power law distribution model from statistical physics is a robust method 
to identify the performance of an investment to the vulnerabilities of severe risk. 
Following this introduction, Section Two provides a literature review covering the Australian 
house price performance, property investment lending and risk issues with extreme values and 
Power Law. Section Three details the selected residential property data and associated 
methodology. Section Four provides the empirical findings and the implications for the small 
investor and the wider finance community. The last section provides the concluding comments.   
 
2. Literature Review 
Much of housing investment literature is focused on how property behaves differently to 
competing financial assets (Case and Shiller 1989, and Bodman and Crosby 2004). In contrast, 
the literature in this paper examines both the disruptive drivers and measurements that lead to 
extreme residential performance risk with reference to a framework for residential property 
determinants, property investment loans and measures of extreme risks. 
Residential property determinants 
Changes in house prices can be affected by a number of external factors. These can be 
categorised into unexpected events, structural changes and core cyclical economic activity – see 
Figures 1 
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Figure 1  
                       Modelling the Economic Environment  
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Figure 1 identifies key drivers of economic performance that may impact upon real estate 
modelling. In the past, leading underlying macroeconomic indicators have provided a good guide 
to future economic conditions and real estate performance. However, these forces do not exist in 
a vacuum, as emerging disruptive factors, both directly and indirectly, challenge core economic 
activity (Trahan and Krantz 2011).  
Overlaid on the underlying economic environment are long term structural changes. These 
structural changes often initiated by policy decisions and innovation appear to have permanent 
far-reaching economic implications as they are unalike historical experiences and difficult to 
forecast. This is evident in the level of technical innovation created by the modern digital age, 
such as technological advances in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, robotics etc, which have 
left policymakers, business leaders and consumers scrambling to understand their full social, 
economic and ethical implications (Higgins 2015).  
Furthermore, economic cycles and structural changes are clouded by extreme, unpredictable, 
short-lived events that include; natural catastrophes (superstorms, pandemics (SARS) and 
tsunamis etc), and man-made disasters (investment strategies (GFC), technological (Chernobyl) 
and acts of terrorism etc). These events can have enormous consequences on the wider 
economic environment and create uncertainty. They are often the origin of market crashes and 
can have a domino effect, leading to a cycle where those directly involved and the wider 
community incurs considerable losses. These clusters of negative price movement can vary in 
time alongside extended periods of stability (Buchanan 2013).  
In detailing the framework, changes in house prices can be affected by the behavior of a number 
of underlying economic variables. Figure 2 shows the last 40 years of Melbourne established 
house prices, headline inflation (Melbourne CPI) and RBA indicative residential leading rates. 
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Figure 2              Melbourne House Prices and Leading Economic Indicators 
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Source: REIV 2015,  ABS 2015, RBA 2015 
In detailing the past 40 years of Melbourne house prices, Figure 2 shows the contrast between 
the volatile inflation and interest rates and the stability in house prices during the 1970s and early 
1980s. This compares to the low inflation and low interest rates in the 1990s where strong 
Melbourne house prices growth was evident. In part, this was caused by financial sector 
deregulation with increased competition which allowed borrows improved access to credit and 
reduced costs (RBA 2014a).  
According to Kohler and van der Merwe (2015) increased access to credit by Australian 
households contributed to the gap between exponential house prices growth and low interest 
rates. The trend is observed in the high household debt-to-income ratio fluctuating around 150% 
over the past decade. As with high debt levels, mortgage interest rate movement is a significant 
explanatory to house price fluctuations and so links the source of disruption in the capital markets 
to the housing landscape. 
Property Investment Loans 
Individual residential property assets are generally large in terms of transaction price. This high 
value threshold means that residential property investment requires considerably high levels of 
capital investment. Using only equity finance can limit investor opportunities for a diversified 
portfolio and lead to high specific property risk. Drawing upon debt finance enables available 
equity funds to be used across a range of investments and achieve diversification benefits. Such 
leverage can enhance expected returns as long as the return on investment exceeds cost of debt. 
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Debt finance conditions placed on the property asset must be met to avoid default and its 
consequences (Higgins 2014). 
In Australia, a large loan is attractive to small investors as debt servicing expenses are tax-
deductible and so creating a strong incentive to take out interest only loans to buy an investment 
property. This is demonstrated in Australia with around 64% of loan approvals to investors are 
interest-only, compared with 31% to owner-occupiers. The typical interest-only period on these 
loans is around five years, though up to 15-year period are also available (RBA 2014b). 
During the loan period, increasing house prices can provide a healthy return to the investor. 
However, if housing prices should fall there is a risk the loan balance will exceed the property 
value and the investor could easily experience negative equity. Depending on market conditions, 
typically investors have a 80% loan to valuation ratios (LVRs) limit, driven in part by investors 
seeking to avoid the cost of lenders mortgage insurance which normally starts above this figure 
(RBA 2014b). 
Measures of Extreme Risk 
Financial market theory suggests that future value can be calculated from a normal distribution 
(bell curve) where most future values will be somewhere near the centre (tallest part of the curve), 
and further out from the centre peak the curve drops off quickly, indicating that large changes in 
price are less likely (Weatherall 2013). Plotted on the conventional bell curve, the standard 
deviation distribution is shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3       Normal Distribution 
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Figure 3 illustrates the bell curved shape of a normal distribution. The standard deviation “σ” 
marks the location of the values, with 68.27% of the values within one standard deviation of the 
mean, similarly 95.45% of the values are within two standard deviation and nearly all (99.73%) of 
the values are within three standard deviation. As the sigma “σ” grows, the odds of being inside 
the bell curve rapidly approaches 100%, while the odds of being outside, an “outlier” (beyond ± 2 
standard deviations), should be an extremely rare event (Wheelan 2013).  
In defining the normal distribution on a bell curve, the possibility of unpredictable large deviations 
(outliers) are simply marginalised, because the data over-sampled the good times and under-
sample the bad. This situation can occur in the finance market with long stable periods providing 
extensive data close to the mean and then, although rare, severe instability with huge fluctuations 
creating booms and crashes. These extreme events far from the centre of the distribution are 
more regular than a normal distribution would predict and create, so called, “fat tailed” 
distributions (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2008).   
Measures of extreme risk provide skewed distribution, as evident in the financial markets which 
rarely follow a normal bell shaped distribution. The higher frequency of extreme outcomes in the 
tails of the distribution may lead to an underestimation of risk. In such cases, Power Law may be 
a more appropriate model to measure fat-tailed distributions. This technique is often used in 
applications of extreme value theory as it overcomes many of the shortcomings of traditional 
financial stress testing (value at risk) models (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2008, Powell 2008).  
In practical terms, conventional distribution calculations are best suited for a data series that 
exhibits mild and well-behaved randomness, as the difference between each point and the mean 
is squared and leads to an equitable scattering of points evenly around the mean. Power Law on 
the other hand, utilises fractal patterns which can relate intensity to frequency and is more suited 
for data series that exhibit irregular large movements. For investment strategies, Power Law can 
define the probability of a rare event, as it provides the parameter that determines the shape of 
the distribution, and therefore the likelihood of given extreme events. The Power Law exponent 
varies inversely with the fatness of the downside tail distribution; being the fatter the tail, the 
greater the likelihood of a given extreme loss (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2008, Powell 2009).  
 
3. Data and Methodology    
For this study, a quarterly 1970 to 2014 Melbourne median house price data series was created 
by combining the Real Estate Institute of Victoria (REIV) established median house price data 
with an extended BIS Shrapnel residential market database. The rent component is from the 
Melbourne consumer price inflation index (ABS catalogue no. 6401).  Based on Heaney et al 
(2012) study, rental returns on private real estate were reduced by 12% to account for outgoings 
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associated with managing residential real estate. This is based on Australian Taxation Office 
information on individual rental income and deductions. Although difficult to substantiate with no 
literature in this area, it does appears compatible with local real estate market evidence. 
In the competitive Australian banking environment, residential property interest rate disclosure is 
sensitive data and difficult to source. However, on market evidence, the RBA publish an indicative 
house lending rate time series which can be a proxy for pricing of residential property debt for this 
research. In providing interest rate changes, there are several additional debt funding 
considerations including debt expiry profile, level of security and debt default process. In 
additional whilst this research selected the variable “floating” rate, interest rates can be fixed over 
the term of the loan, where future payments are known. The choice between fixed and floating 
interest rates is dependent on several factors, including the economic and financial environment 
and debt pricing mechanism adopted by the financier. This can be examined in a future paper. 
According to Lux (2006), Power Law is a mathematical relationship between two quantities with a 
central theme that Power Law provides an exponential relationship that exhibits the property of 
scale invariance. There are various formulations and expressions with the simplest Power Law 
distribution showing the relationship between two variables, X and Y, which be written as follows:   
Equation 1 
Y = X α k 
In practice, few empirical data sets observe Power Law distributions for all values of X. More 
often Power Law models apply to: 
i. Extreme values that exhibit outlier status relative to the “goodness-of-fit” between the 
empirical and normal distributed data sets (Damodaran 2008, Lux 2006). 
ii. Past extreme volatility in equity market returns were found to have a Power Law 
distribution with an exponent of three (3). The robustness of the findings across different 
stock markets has led to the term Cubic Power Law, and provides a simple model to 
scale low probability extreme events in the financial markets (Gabiax 2008, Mandelbrot 
and Taleb 2006).     
As extreme price swings appear to be the norm in current financial markets, Power Law 
distributions can provide valuable information on equity market outliers. This needs to be 
examined relative to competing asset class returns, to see if extreme outliers exist and have 
features which follow the Power Law distribution. This research covers the key asset class of 
residential property.  
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4. Results   
The first step is to examine the quarterly investment performance of the Melbourne residential 
property market total return data with different gearing levels. Descriptive statistics provide a 
simple summary of the selected data as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1               Descriptive Statistics 
Actual 20% 40% 60% 80%
Mean 4.0% 4.4% 5.1% 6.5% 10.7%
SD 6.8% 8.4% 11.2% 16.8% 33.7%
SD-1 -2.8% -4.0% -6.1% -10.4% -23.0%
SD-2 -9.5% -12.5% -17.4% -27.2% -56.7%
SD+1 10.7% 12.8% 16.3% 23.3% 44.3%
SD+2 17.5% 21.3% 27.6% 40.2% 78.0%
Risk/return ratio 1.69 1.91 2.20 2.60 3.16
Median 3.9% 4.4% 5.1% 6.5% 10.8%
Kurtosis 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03
Skewness 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.17
Range 43.5% 54.5% 72.7% 109.2% 218.6%
Min -15.3% -20.0% -27.9% -43.6% -90.8%
Max 28.2% 34.5% 44.8% 65.6% 127.9%
Melbourne Residential Total Returns with Lending Levels
 
 
Table 1 highlights the average ungeared quarterly total returns of 4.0% and a high standard 
deviation of 6.8%. This indicates that the data points are spread out over a large range of values 
as evident by the maximum (28.2%) and minimum (-15.3%) quarterly returns which are well 
outside ± 2 standard deviations. Interestingly, this spread is not supported by a relatively high 
1.05 excess Kurtosis reading which suggests the data are clustered close to the mean with some 
values lying at the extremities of the distribution. This gives an impression that the data appear to 
be taller and narrower than a normal distribution with fatter (heavier) tails.  
In addition, Table 1 shows the average returns increases with higher gearing levels. An 80% 
gearing level can lead to long term 140% improvement in the residential property total returns, 
although the risk has increased five-fold. This is evident when examining the range of maximum 
and minimum returns, an 80% gearing level has a range of 128% compared to the ungeared 
property total return range of 28%. In the 80% gearing level, the large negative return of -98% 
would represent a substantial drop in value, over 50%, and increases the chance that the 
residential property will be in loan default with the possibility of the investor losing the property 
and their equity. 
Also the investment profile changes substantially from the ungeared property total return 
risk/return ratio of 1.69 to the higher risk/return ratio of 3.16 at the 80% gearing level. The 
increased risk can have a major impact on the inclusion of geared property in a mixed asset 
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portfolio. This is evidenced by risk adverse self-managed superannuation funds preference for 
low geared residential property investments (ASIC 2016). 
In detailing descriptive statistics, the number of these extreme values outside ± 2 standard 
deviations gives a dumb bell feature (fat tails) to the asymmetric bell curve distribution. This is a 
common characteristic when examining extreme risk, most importantly on the left side of the 
distribution covering the dangerous downside values, which more often highlight events leading 
to financial ruin. As the negative distribution is important to examining downside risk, Table 2 
compares the actual downside quarterly residential property total return values to the standard 
bell curve distribution from the mean. Interestingly the variation remained nearly constant across 
the different gearing levels.  
Table 2   Downside Risk Comparison:   
Normal Bell Curve Distribution Values to the  
Ungeared Quarterly Residential Property Total Return  
Normal Distribution Actual Data Variation
Mean to -1SD 56 58 2
-1SD to -2SD 21 18 -3
-2SD to -3SD 3 4 1
-3SD > 0 0 0  
 
Table 2 compares the spread of the 80 actual data points to that for a standard bell curve 
distribution.  It is evident that there is a lack of actual data points between -1SD and -2SD data 
with the excess occurring close to the mean and on the extremities (beyond -2SD). This 
highlights the contrast between stable market conditions and periods of large negative price 
movements.  
The location of the four downside outliers (beyond -2 standard deviations) in the residential 
property time series appeared independent although they occurred in the September quarter 
being in order 1987, 1981 1982 and 1989. Interestingly the 1980s covered period of sharp rises in 
already high interest rates. Extreme risk with single outliers in isolation should be viewed together 
with surrounding data.   
The periods of extreme risk can be magnified in the residential property markets in relation to 
individual property performance, these factors include: 
i. Short term leases. Unlike many illiquid asset classes with long leases (for example: 
infrastructure and commercial property), residential property leases are normally for a 
short 6 – 12 months. Tenant turnover should be minimised as can lead to temporary loss 
of income. This is especially relevant in a competitive marketplace with high vacancy 
rates.  
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ii. Maintenance and Obsolescence. Whilst residential property are immobile, long lasting 
and capital intensive, there is uncertainty as finishes, design and structure can become 
dilapidated and ineffective. If overlooked, decay and obsolescence limited usability and 
occupant satisfaction and so lead to a loss of building performance.  
In identifying the actual ungeared property data spread, the likelihood of the extreme values 
occurring beyond minus 2 standard deviations on a normal bell curve distribution can be 
measured by a Z-test for un-geared and geared property data alongside the Cubic Power Law 
distribution model. For the 40 years of actual quarterly data, Table 3 shows the probability of the 
four outermost values occurring compared to the Cubic Power Law application.  
Table 3  
Event Probability - Standard Bell Curve Distribution and                           
Cubic Power Law Distribution 
Data (%) SD Z Score table
Probability 
1 in
Event 
Year
Power 
cube
Probability 
1 in
Event 
Year
No Gearing
1 -15.3% -2.86 0.21% 465 116 0.8% 128 32
2 -11.7% -2.32 1.03% 97 24 1.5% 68 17
3 -11.5% -2.29 1.11% 90 23 1.5% 66 16
4 -10.3% -2.11 1.75% 57 14 1.9% 52 13
20% Gearing
1 -20.0% -2.90 0.19% 529 132 0.7% 133 33
2 -15.3% -2.34 0.98% 102 26 1.4% 70 17
3 -15.1% -2.32 1.03% 97 24 1.5% 68 17
4 -13.8% -2.16 1.53% 65 16 1.8% 55 14
40% Gearing
1 -27.9% -2.94 0.17% 601 150 0.7% 139 35
2 -21.3% -2.35 0.93% 108 27 1.4% 72 18
3 -21.2% -2.35 0.95% 105 26 1.4% 71 18
4 -19.8% -2.21 1.34% 74 19 1.7% 60 15
60% Gearing
1 -43.6% -2.97 0.15% 681 170 0.7% 145 36
2 -33.5% -2.37 0.88% 113 28 1.4% 73 18
3 -33.5% -2.37 0.89% 113 28 1.4% 73 18
4 -31.7% -2.27 1.18% 85 21 1.6% 64 16
80% Gearing
1 -90.8% -3.01 0.13% 769 192 0.7% 150 38
2 -70.2% -2.40 0.82% 122 31 1.3% 76 19
3 -69.8% -2.39 0.85% 118 30 1.3% 75 19
4 -67.3% -2.32 1.03% 97 24 1.5% 68 17
Standard Bell Curve Distribution Cubic Power Law Distribution
 
Table 3 points to a disconnect between the standard bell curve distribution and the actual 
residential property market total returns. The furthest actual ungeared negative value -15.3% 
represents a -2.86 standard deviation reading, which on the Z test table for a one tailed downside 
distribution shows a 1 in 465 chance of the event occurring, being an unrealistic 1 in 116  year 
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event. Alternatively, the Cubic Power Law of returns illustrate the probabilities of extreme events 
occurring are substantially improved to realistic levels. For the extreme outlier, there is a 1 in 128 
chance of the event occurring, being a realistic 1 in 32 year event. Below -2 standard deviation, a 
Cubic Power Law reading converges to the normal distribution curve.   
Conversely, taking the calculated means and standard deviation for the 40 years of actual 
quarterly residential property market total returns ungeared and geared, the Z test for a one tailed 
downside distribution calculates the furthest negative value. See Table 4 for the furthermost 
actual and generated outlier. 
Table 4                  Actual and Generated Extreme Outlier  
Actual Generated Difference
No Gearing -15.3% -14.8% 3.4%
20% Gearing -20.0% -18.1% 10.5%
40% Gearing -27.9% -25.4% 9.7%
60% Gearing -43.6% -38.9% 12.0%
80% Gearing -90.8% -78.7% 15.3%  
Table 4 highlights the difference between the ungeared Z test for a one tailed downside 
distribution calculates the furthest negative value at -14.8%. This is a 3.4% difference to the 
actual worst negative value of -15.3%. As the gearing level increases the difference between the 
furthest actual outlier and the generated data outlier increases to 15.3%. This shortfall highlights 
the limitations of the standard deviation model for a measure of extreme risk where the data 
exhibits asymmetric fat tailed distribution features. 
While scalable laws do not yet yield precise results, Cubic Power Law model can be an extremely 
robust method to identify the performance of an investment to the vulnerability to severe risk, 
where extreme values are more common than a normal distribution implies. This fundamentally 
quantifies distributions that have “fat tails”, namely, a higher probability of extreme values that can 
have a significant impact on long term performance (Mandelbrot and Taleb 2006).   
Whilst this research examines residential property returns, the asset class should not be considered 
in isolation as alternative investments could exhibit similar features. This is evident by Mandelbrot 
and Hudson (2008), Silver (2013) and Weatherall (2013) research on the American stockmarket, all 
showing that a normal bell curve distribution does not effectively account for extreme price 
movements and that equity markets are wildly random. 
For residential property, extreme downside risk provides a challenge especially with small 
Australian investors attracted to high gearing levels. The traditional risk management techniques 
are to narrow and constraining to identify the implication at a market level, particularly the small 
investor exposure to interest rate movements and separably the implications of individual property 
 13 
features. Property professionals need a measure of extreme risk as the first step to analysing and 
managing potential risks which can limit small investors experiencing unexpected financial ruin. 
 
5.       Conclusion  
Standard deviation is a recognised mathematical indicator which forms one of the key statistical 
approaches for the banking and finance community to measure and compare risk performance 
across asset classes. Whilst the standard deviation model work well in theory, under stable 
conditions, it fails when stable assumptions cease to hold and extreme volatility occurs. This is 
evident in residential property markets which can experience extended stable periods and major 
unpredictable events, creating large concentrated negative price fluctuations which may not be 
reflected in standard risk calculations.  
This research studies 40 years of quarterly Melbourne residential property market performance 
data for normal distribution features and signs of extreme downside risk. The results show that 
the data appears to be asymmetric, being taller and narrower than a normal bell curve distribution 
with fat dumb bell tails at the left perimeter. There is a disconnect between the standard bell 
curve distribution and the actual residential property market total returns. This is demonstrated by 
the furthest actual ungeared negative value -15.3% representing the probabilities of an unrealistic 
1 in 116 year event occurring. Alternatively, the Cubic Power Law of returns substantially 
improved the probabilities of extreme events occurring with a realistic 1 in 32 year event. 
The application of a cubic power law distribution model from statistical physics provides an 
insightful and robust method to identify the performance of an investment to the vulnerabilities of 
severe risk. Analysis of extreme downside risk should form a key part of the residential decision 
process, as the traditional risk management practices are too narrow and constraining a definition. 
Measuring extreme risk and the likelihood of ruin is an important initial step for market 
participants especially where individual residential property investors have a large debt exposure 
which can lead to financial ruin. 
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